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THE GEORGIA CONDOMINIUM ACT’S
AUTHORIZATION OF PRIVATE TAKINGS:
REVISITING KELO AND “BITTER WITH THE
SWEET”
Tyler Gaines*
Homeownership provides owners with certain property
rights and a sense of security. One of the most important
property rights is the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
which prohibits the government from taking private property
without just compensation. The Clause has been incorporated
against the states and is interpreted as prohibiting any taking
that does not serve a public use. Despite these constitutional
protections, numerous condominium owners face the threat of
private investors taking their units for no public use, without
just compensation, and without the owners’ consent.
Many state condominium laws allow private investors who
obtain a specified percentage of a condominium’s units to force
the minority unit owners to sell their units. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has written many opinions interpreting the
Takings Clause, the Court has not addressed whether states
may permit the forcible transfer of condominiums—or other
forms of common-interest homeownership—without the
unanimous consent of the owners. Although takings for
economic development are permitted, no scholarship has
considered whether the Court’s reasoning behind its rejection of
the “bitter with the sweet” doctrine can be applied to the Court’s
Takings Clause analysis to prohibit states from statutorily
conditioning condominium ownership upon waiver of
constitutional protections. This Note suggests that the Georgia
Condominium Act—and other state condominium termination
statutes—may unconstitutionally permit investors to effectuate
private takings by forcing dissenting minority owners to sell
their fee simple interests in their units.

*

J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank Dean
Randy Beck for his thoughtful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Property rights are often considered essential for selfgovernment and political liberty.1 Real property ownership carries
with it certain rights that many consider to be fundamental.2
Generally, state law creates and defines property rights,3 but the
U.S. Constitution provides several key property protections by
prohibiting the following: quartering of soldiers without an owner’s
consent;4 unreasonable searches and seizures;5 deprivations of
property without due process of law;6 and takings of private
property for public use without just compensation.7 The Fourteenth
Amendment has been interpreted to incorporate most of these
protections against the states.8
Of the property rights that the Constitution affords, the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause is likely the most significant to
homeowners. The Takings Clause provides that “private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”9 The
American Dream purportedly encourages all individuals to become
homeowners, but homeownership would be meaningless if the

1 James W. Ely Jr., “Poor Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing
Rights of Property Owners, 2004–2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 40 (“[T]he Framers of the
Constitution and Bill of Rights were motivated in large part by the desire to establish
safeguards for property. They felt that property rights and liberty were indissolubly linked.”).
2 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 560
(1997) (arguing that some property rights are fundamental and should be accorded
substantive due process protections).
3 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Property interests . . . are not
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law . . . .”).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
5 Id. amend. IV (providing that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their . . .
houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”).
6 Id. amend. V (prohibiting the federal government from depriving citizens of property
“without due process of law”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states from depriving citizens
of property “without due process of law”).
7 Id. amend. V.
8 Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Hector R. Lozada, A Nomination of a Supreme Court Justice:
The Incorporation Doctrine Revisited, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 365, 379–80 (2010) (noting
that the U.S. Supreme Court’s selective incorporation doctrine incorporates most guarantees
of the Bill of Rights against the states).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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government could take one’s property without a legitimate purpose
and without justly compensating the deprived owner.10
One form of homeownership—common interest communities—
presents a unique Takings Clause question. Common interest
communities, such as condominiums, permit some individuals to
own homes when they otherwise could not afford to do so, because
they can live on smaller properties and share amenities.11 These
communities are uniquely structured because, while the individuals
own their properties, a central document and association govern
their communities in a manner similar to corporations.12 Because of
this unique real property structure, many states have adopted
condominium termination statutes that permit a condominium to
be terminated and sold if a specified percentage of unit owners
desire it to be.13 Such termination statutes have produced some
seemingly unintended consequences.14 For example, termination
statutes often permit investors to become “bulk owner[s]” by
purchasing the requisite percentage of units and then allowing
10 See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership
is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 189 (2009) (“Home ownership is viewed as key
to achieving the ‘American Dream.’”). Cf. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 661 (1833) (“[I]n a free government, almost all other
rights would become utterly worthless, if the government possessed an uncontrollable power
over the private fortune of every citizen.”).
11 See Douglas C. Harris & Nicole Gilewicz, Dissolving Condominium, Private Takings, and
the Nature of Property (“By producing physically smaller interests in land and distributing
some of the costs of land ownership among co-owners, this private–common property hybrid
enables some, who might not otherwise afford it, to purchase a freehold interest in land.”), in
RETHINKING EXPROPRIATION LAW II: CONTEXT, CRITERIA, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
EXPROPRIATION 263, 264 (Björn Hoops et al. eds., 2015); see also Zoomer, Is Condo Living
(June
25,
2014),
Right
for
You?,
EVERYTHINGZOOMER.COM
https://www.everythingzoomer.com/money/personal-finance/2014/06/25/is-condo-livingright-for-you/ (describing some of the benefits of living in a condominium, including the
sharing of costs and amenities).
12 See Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 11, at 264 (noting that “[c]ondominium legislation
utilizes a corporate form . . . [as] a mechanism for governing their private and common
property”).
13 See id. at 266 (discussing how jurisdictions typically enact statutes that establish
condominium dissolution rules and procedures because of the “potential for conflict between
title holders”).
14 See Phillip M. Hudson, Unintended Consequences of Fla.’s Condo Termination Law,
LAW360 (July 16, 2015, 10:50 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/678944 (recognizing that
Florida’s condominium termination statute raises several unintended constitutional issues).
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them to force the remaining owners to sell their units.15 Currently,
some condominium unit owners in Athens, Georgia are fighting an
investor’s attempt to terminate their condominium and force the
sale of their units under the Georgia Condominium Act’s
termination statute, O.C.G.A. section 44-3-98.16
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has written numerous
opinions applying and interpreting the Takings Clause, the Court
has not directly addressed whether states may permit the
termination of condominiums without the unanimous consent of the
owners. Some have argued that these statutes are
unconstitutional.17 But this literature overlooks U.S. Supreme
Court decisions which permit takings and transfers of property to
other private parties for economic development.18 Further, no
scholarship considers whether the Court’s reasoning behind its
rejection of the “bitter with the sweet” doctrine can be applied to a
Takings Clause inquiry to prohibit states from statutorily
conditioning ownership in condominiums upon waiver of
constitutional protections.19
This Note suggests that the Georgia Condominium Act (the
GCA)—and other state condominium termination statutes—may be
unconstitutional as it permits investors to effectuate private
takings by forcing minority owners to sell their fee simple interests
15 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.117(3) (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.)
(providing a process of condominium termination for a “bulk owner”).
16 See Jim Thompson, Athens Condo Owners Sue Developer and Others, Alleging Violations
of State RICO Act, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (June 28, 2017, 4:00 PM),
https://www.onlineathens.com/local-news/2017-06-28/athens-condo-owners-sue-developerand-others-alleging-violations-state-rico (discussing a lawsuit alleging that an Athens
investor is using “a scheme to acquire eighty percent (80%) of [a condominium’s] units . . . ,
partition the condominium at a reduced fair market value, and eject [the p]laintiffs from their
homes”). For examples of hostile condominium takeovers outside of Georgia, see Deborah
Goonan, Can Hostile Takeovers of Condominium Associations Be Prevented?, INDEP. AM.
COMMUNITIES (Jan. 2, 2017), https://independentamericancommunities.com/2017/01/02/canhostile-takeovers-of-condominium-associations-be-prevented/, which discusses condominium
termination attempts in Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
17 See, e.g., Marlene Brito, Terminating a Condominium or Terminating Property Rights: A
Distinction Without a Difference, 45 REAL EST. L.J. 200, 232 (2016) (arguing that Florida’s
condominium termination statute “is currently unconstitutional and cannot be upheld”);
Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 11, at 266 (arguing that legislation permitting the dissolution
of condominiums without unanimous consent is an unconstitutional private taking).
18 See infra Section III.B.
19 See infra Section III.B.6.
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in their units.20 Part II reviews the background of the GCA and
explains how it permits bulk owners to terminate condominiums
and force the sale of non-consenting owners’ units. Part III
examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s Takings Clause doctrine and
the Georgia Constitution. This Part then discusses whether unit
owners consent to termination statutes by purchasing units in
states with such statutes. Or does the U.S. Supreme Court’s
rejection of the “bitter with the sweet” doctrine prohibit states from
limiting unit owners’ Fifth Amendment rights by conditioning unit
ownership upon consent to termination statutes? While the GCA
may be unconstitutional, modern courts are not likely to find a
taking when bulk owners force minority owners to sell their units
pursuant to a previously enacted statutory scheme.
Nevertheless, Part IV suggests that the Georgia General
Assembly should consider taking at least two steps to protect the
state’s homeowners. First, the General Assembly should amend the
termination statute to require bulk owners to submit a termination
plan that affirms that a non-consensual termination would result in
a recognized public benefit. Second, the General Assembly should
amend the GCA to require condominium declarations to specify a
percentage of unit votes necessary for termination. This would
require the unit owners to contractually waive takings claims, as
the state would not be authorizing the taking by prescribing its own
statutory default percentage.

II. BACKGROUND
Common interest communities are “creatures” of state law.21 The
Apartment Ownership Act (the AOA) originally governed common
interest communities in Georgia, but the state General Assembly
passed the GCA in 1975 to replace the AOA.22 The GCA was
20 This Note only addresses whether the GCA’s termination statute is constitutional when
an investor or bulk owner seeks to terminate a condominium solely for its private benefit
without the unanimous consent of the unit owners. This Note does not challenge, for example,
the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it permits termination upon a vote by a specified
percentage of unit owners or date expressly provided in the condominium’s declaration.
21 See Brito, supra note 17, at 201 (“[T]he existence of condominiums is only allowed by the
granting power of a statute.”).
22 See generally O.C.G.A. § 44-3-113 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) (explaining
that the GCA “shall apply to all property which is submitted to [the GCA] and shall also apply
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originally drafted by the State Bar of Georgia’s Section of Real
Property Law’s Condominium Statute Review Committee.23 The
GCA governs condominiums created after its effective date, while
the AOA generally continues to govern condominiums that were
created prior to the GCA’s enactment.24
The GCA permits unit owners who own four-fifths of the
condominium association’s votes to terminate the condominium.25
Thus, a single investor or bulk owner can terminate a condominium
by obtaining eighty percent of the condominium’s units. Once an
investor terminates the condominium, the property that once
constituted the condominium becomes owned by all of the unit
owners as tenants in common in proportion to their prior ownership
interests.26 As a tenant in common, the investor can then petition a
superior court for a partition for sale.27 The minority unit owners
would have an opportunity to buy the investor’s condominiums at
fair market value;28 however, if the minority owners cannot afford

to any condominium created . . . pursuant to the [AOA] if the instruments creating such
condominium are amended in accordance with their terms in order to submit the
condominium” under the GCA).
23 See Jeffrey E. Young, The Georgia Condominium Act of 1975: A Sound Basis for
Innovative Condominium Practice, 24 EMORY L.J. 891, 891 n.2 (1975) (describing the
legislative history of the GCA).
24 See O.C.G.A. § 44-3-113(a) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) (providing that
the GCA shall apply to any condominium created after 1975); Young, supra note 23, at 891
n.3 (stating that the AOA “will still govern condominiums created before October 1, 1975”).
25 See O.C.G.A. § 44-3-98(a) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) (“The condominium
shall be terminated only by the agreement of unit owners of units to which four-fifths of the
votes in the association pertain . . . .”).
26 See id. § 44-3-98(d) (“Upon the effective date of a termination agreement, all of the
property constituting the condominium shall be owned by the unit owners as tenants in
common and shall be in proportion to their respective undivided interests in the common
elements immediately prior to the effective date.”).
27 See id. § 44-6-160 (“When two or more persons are common owners of lands and
tenements . . . any one of such common owners may apply by petition to the superior court . . .
for a writ of partition . . . .”).
28 See id. § 44-6-166.1(b) (“Whenever an application is made for the partition of property
and any of the parties in interest convinces the court that a fair and equitable division of the
property cannot be made by means of metes and bounds because of improvements made
thereon . . . the court shall proceed pursuant to this Code section.”); id. § 44-6-166.1(e)(2)
(“Each party in interest may pay toward the amount required to purchase any petitioners’
shares of the appraised price an amount in proportion to that party’s share of the total shares
of property of all parties in interest . . . .”).
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the investor’s units, the entire property would be subjected to a
public sale, where the investor or bulk owner can bid on the
property.29 If the investor wins the bid, it has completed a hostile
takeover, forcing the minority owners to transfer their titles to it.30
No reported cases in Georgia state courts examine the
constitutionality of the hostile takeovers of condominiums that the
GCA authorizes.

III. ANALYSIS
The GCA permits condominium unit owners with “four-fifths” of
a condominium’s units to terminate the condominium31 and seek a
partition for sale, forcing the transfer of title from the minority unit
owners.32 This Part reviews the GCA under both the U.S. and
Georgia constitutions and finds that although the GCA may be
unconstitutional for authorizing private takings, modern courts are
unlikely to arrive at this conclusion.
A. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION’S CONTRACTS CLAUSE

The U.S. Constitution’s Contracts Clause prohibits states from
passing a law that “impair[s] the Obligation of Contracts.”33 Courts
can declare condominium termination statutes unconstitutional
under the Contracts Clause if they have retroactive effect.34 Since
condominium declarations are binding contracts between the
condominium’s association and its owners, a later-enacted statute
that creates a termination provision absent in the declaration
conflicts with the condominium owners’ vested contractual rights.
See id. § 44-6-166.1(e)(1) (providing that if the minority unit owners are unable to
purchase the majority unit owner’s units at the appraised price, “the property shall be subject
to public sale”).
30 See id. (allowing, implicitly, for investors to bid on and buy the other owners’ units in the
public sale).
31 Id. § 44-3-98 (permitting condominium terminations and transforming all condominium
property to be owned by the unit owners as tenants in common).
32 See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
34 See Brito, supra note 17, at 223 (arguing that Florida’s condominium termination statute
would be an impairment of contract in violation of the U.S. and Florida constitutions if it was
retroactively applied to declarations created before the statute’s enactment).
29
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For example, in 2016, a Florida appellate court affirmed that
Florida’s condominium termination statute could not apply
retroactively to condominium declarations that existed prior to the
statute’s effective date “without causing a constitutional
impairment of contract.”35
Although condominium termination statutes can be
unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause, the GCA does not
violate it. Prior-enacted statutes like the GCA cannot impair
contracts or declarations that are made after the statutes’
enactment.36 Unlike the Florida condominium termination
statute—which was held unconstitutional because it applied
retroactively to condominiums whose declarations did not provide
for termination upon a specified percentage of unit owners’
consent37—the GCA’s termination statute does not automatically
apply to declarations that were created before its enactment.38
Rather, the AOA governs declarations created prior to the GCA’s
1975 enactment, unless the condominiums amend their
declarations to “avail themselves” of the GCA.39 Therefore, the
GCA’s termination statute does not impair unit owners’ vested
contractual rights in violation of the Contracts Clause.
B. THE U.S. AND GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONS’ TAKINGS CLAUSES

Although the GCA does not violate the Contracts Clause, it may
violate the U.S. Constitution’s Takings Clause and the Georgia
Constitution’s takings clause. Both constitutions provide that
private property may not be taken unless the property will be used
for a public use and the owner is justly compensated.40
Tropicana Condo. Ass’n v. Tropical Condo., LLC, 208 So. 3d 755, 757, 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016).
36 See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 (1982) (“[A] statute cannot be said to impair
a contract that did not exist at the time of its enactment.”).
37 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
38 O.C.G.A. § 44-3-113(b) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) (“Nothing in [the GCA]
shall be construed to affect the validity of any provision of any instrument recorded prior to
October 1, 1975.”).
39 Id.
40 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”); GA. CONST. art. I, § III, para. I(a) (“[P]rivate property shall not be taken
or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid.”).
35
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1. Private Property. For the U.S. and Georgia constitutional
takings clauses to apply, “private property” must be taken.41 As a
general matter, condominium units are the private property of the
unit owners.42 In defining “property” under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that an
individual has a property interest once they have a “legitimate
claim of entitlement” to the property.43 Similarly, with regard to the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Court has held that
states cannot statutorily alter permitted uses of property in a
manner inconsistent with “reasonable investment-backed
expectations.”44 Subject to the prohibition on interfering with
property owners’ reasonable investment-backed expectations, state
law generally defines property interests.45
In Georgia, condominium units are private property within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment.46 The GCA provides that “[f]or all
purposes, each condominium unit shall constitute a separate parcel
of real property which shall be distinct from all other condominium
units.”47 Unit owners’ property interests in their units are referred
to as being held in “fee simple.”48 Since Georgia law defines
condominium units as real property, unit owners have property
interests in their units; a taking of those units without a public
purpose and just compensation thus violates the Takings Clause.
2. Taking. To establish a takings claim, property owners must
first show that their property was taken.49 Two types of takings are

41 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken . . . .”); GA. CONST. art. I,
§ III, para. I(a) (“[P]rivate property shall not be taken . . . .”).
42 See Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 11, at 263 (describing condominium ownership as
“individually titled parcels of land” held by “individual freehold or fee simple titles” and coowned with “each [owner] holding an undivided share of the whole”). Depending on the
jurisdiction, ownership interests are termed “single freehold” or “fee simple” interests. Id.
43 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
44 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017).
45 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 707 (2010)
(“Generally speaking, state law defines property interests . . . .” (citing Phillips v. Washington
Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998))).
46 See Brewer v. Williams, 305 S.E.2d 891, 892 (Ga Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing
condominium units as private property “owned in fee simple”).
47 O.C.G.A. § 44-3-96 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) (emphasis added); see also
Brewer, 305 S.E.2d at 892 (“Each condominium [unit] is owned in fee simple.”).
48 Brewer, 305 S.E.2d at 892.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken . . . .”).
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recognized under the U.S. Constitution’s Takings Clause.50 First, a
regulatory taking occurs when the government “goes too far” when
regulating an owner’s property rights.51 Second, physical takings
occur when an owner is permanently deprived of their property.52
Condominium termination statutes similar to the GCA are in a
unique position because they do not fit neatly within either form of
taking.53 In regulatory takings, for example, the owner’s right to use
the property is restricted, but the right to possess the regulated
property is generally not taken.54 Further, the regulations or
statutes that are challenged are typically enacted after one receives
title to the property at issue.55 However, the GCA permits an
investor or bulk owner to strip the minority unit owners of all
interests in their units, including their rights to possession.56
Non-consensual condominium termination statutes also do not
fit well under a physical takings analysis because physical takings
are generally executed through a governmental entity’s eminent
domain power.57 Yet statutes that authorize a majority to terminate
a condominium typically undergo an entirely separate process than
See Brito, supra note 17, at 216–17 (contrasting regulatory takings from physical
takings).
51 See id. at 216–17 (describing regulatory takings as occurring when a regulation denies
owners all economically beneficial use of their property).
52 See id. at 217 (noting that a physical taking occurs when the government physically
occupies or intrudes upon one’s private property).
53 Cf. id. (noting that Florida’s former condominium “termination statute not only acts as
a regulatory taking but as a physical taking as well”).
54 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (explaining that
regulatory takings occur when a regulation “compel[s] . . . a physical ‘invasion’” of one’s
property or “denies [the owner] all economically beneficial or productive use of [their] land”).
Under either form of regulatory taking, the owner retains possession of her property. Id.
55 See, e.g., id. at 1006–09 (challenging an act enacted two years after the owner came into
possession of two beachfront properties); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (finding a taking when a New York statute authorized
television companies to install television cables on a landlord’s property). But see Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626–32 (2001) (permitting a plaintiff to bring a suit against a
restriction that was enacted prior to him gaining ownership of the restricted property).
56 See O.C.G.A. §§ 44-3-98, 44-6-166.1 (permitting bulk owners of condominiums to
terminate the condominium and subsequently force minority owners to sell their interests if
they cannot purchase the majority owners’ interests at the majority owners’ appraised price).
57 See, e.g., Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1190 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (“The
ordinary taking occurs when a governmental entity formally condemns a landowner's
property and obtains the fee simple pursuant to eminent domain proceedings.”).
50
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eminent domain and condemnation proceedings.58 Rather, such
statutes generally only require the execution of a private agreement
between a specified percentage of unit owners.59 Nevertheless,
condominium terminations facially resemble physical takings
because they strip all property interests from the minority owners
and give them to another private party (usually the investor or bulk
owner). Given the difficulty of fitting condominium termination
statutes within either the regulatory or physical categories of
takings, this Note assesses each element of a takings claim under
both categories.
The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to implement a “set
formula” for determining whether a statute rises to the level of a
regulatory taking, instead opting to conduct “ad hoc” inquiries by
applying what have been deemed the Penn Central factors.60 These
factors include “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant”; “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations”; and “the character of the
governmental action.”61 But the Court has identified two
circumstances when a regulation will be deemed a taking per se
without application of the Penn Central factors.62 First, a regulatory
taking occurs whenever a regulation authorizes a physical invasion
of one’s property.63 Such takings require just compensation no
58 For example, states often have separate statutes that deal with condominium
terminations resulting from eminent domain or owner agreement. Compare UNIF.
CONDOMINIUM ACT § 2-118(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980) (“Except for a taking . . . by eminent
domain . . . a condominium may be terminated only by agreement of unit owners of units to
which at least [eighty] percent of the votes in the association are allocated . . . .”), with id. § 1107(a) (“If a unit is acquired by eminent domain . . . the award must compensate the unit
owner for the unit and its interest in the common elements, whether or not any common
elements are acquired.”).
59 See, e.g., id. § 2-118 (“[A] condominium may be terminated only by agreement of unit
owners of units to which at least [eighty] percent of the votes in the association are
allocated . . . .”).
60 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978)).
61 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
62 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (“We have . . . described at least two discrete categories of
regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest
advanced in support of the restraint.”).
63 See id. (stating that a regulation that “compel[s]” a physical invasion of one’s property is
a taking).
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matter the size of the intrusion.64 For example, the U.S. Supreme
Court found a regulatory taking when a state statute authorized a
private company to occupy one and a half cubic feet of a landlord’s
building for a television cable.65 Second, a per se regulatory taking
occurs when the regulation denies the property owner “all
economically beneficial or productive use of land.”66
The GCA’s termination statute may appear to effect a taking
under both of these regulatory takings categories and thus not
require an ad hoc factual inquiry through the Penn Central factors.
The statute authorizes private parties to terminate condominiums
and partition for a forced sale.67 Therefore, the statute not only
authorizes the intrusion of other parties into minority owners’ units,
but it also authorizes the majority to obtain full possession and
ownership of the units, depriving the minority unit owners of “all
economically beneficial or productive use” of their properties.68 The
GCA’s termination provision also seems to classify as a taking
under a physical takings analysis because it authorizes an investor
or bulk owner to take the minority owners’ units through a forced
sale.69
Some have identified condominium termination statute “takings”
as occurring the moment a condominium is terminated and the
objecting minority unit owners’ fee simple property interests are
transformed into a tenancy in common.70 That proposition does not
require the ousting of unit owners from their units following a
public sale for there to be a taking: a non-consensual transformation
64 See id. (providing that such a regulation requires just compensation “no matter how
minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it”).
65 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438–41 (1982)
(finding a taking when a New York statute authorized television companies to install
television cables on the landlords’ properties).
66 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
67 See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
68 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; see also Brito, supra note 17, at 217 (arguing that condominium
termination statutes effect a regulatory taking by turning unit owners’ titles to their
properties into “worthless piece[s] of paper”).
69 See Brito, supra note 17, at 217–18 (arguing that condominium termination statutes are
“more comparable” to physical takings than regulatory takings because each unit owner “is
losing title to his property along with all possible uses”).
70 See, e.g., Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 11, at 266 (“[C]ondominium statutes identify a
certain class of title holders . . . and delegate to that class the power to divest another class
of title holders (usually a minority opposed to dissolution) of their individual freehold titles.”).
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of one property interest into a less valuable one is the only
requirement.71 However, this Note suggests that in determining
whether a taking has occurred, no single part of the condominium
termination and sale process should be viewed in isolation; rather,
the entire transfer and sale process that the state’s statute permits
must be assessed to determine the true authority that the
legislature grants to private parties. Accordingly, the GCA’s
statutory process for termination permits private takings not only
because unit owners may terminate other unit owners’ fee simple
property interests, but also because Georgia law permits forced
sales to follow.72 For example, while Florida’s condominium
termination statute expressly provides for both the termination and
sale of condominiums, Georgia law permits the same result while
omitting express language in the GCA that permits a sale to follow
termination.73 Rather, a Georgia condominium owner may force a
public sale under the state’s tenancy in common law.74 Under
Georgia law, investors or bulk owners may terminate the fee simple
interests of the minority unit owners and the minority’s remaining
property interests through a forced public sale.75 States cannot
escape their constitutional obligation to pay just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment by authorizing takings through
methods which may not seem like a traditional taking or state act

71 Id. at 278 (“Non-consensual dissolution is . . . a form of taking—a private-to-private
taking—in which one private entity dispossesses another private entity of an interest in
land.”).
72 See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
73 Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.117(3) (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.)
(providing that when a bulk owner terminates a condominium, the bulk owner may gain
ownership of the remaining units if the remaining unit owners are compensated with the fair
market value of their units), with O.C.G.A. § 44-3-98 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis.
Sess.) (creating a tenancy in common upon termination which would then allow an owner to
seek a partition for sale under section 44-6-160).
74 See O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) (permitting tenants
in common to petition for a partition for sale).
75 See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
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yet permit the same outcome.76 Such “functionally equivalent” state
actions still constitute takings.77
A later section of this Note addresses a potential argument that
takings cannot occur under the GCA because the government is not
the actor directly taking the property. Another argument addressed
is that the owners never had a property interest in continued
ownership because they consented to—or otherwise took their
property subject to—the possibility of termination.78
3. Public Use. The takings clauses of the U.S. and Georgia
constitutions provide that governments cannot take private
property unless doing so will serve a public use.79 Courts interpret
these clauses to generally prohibit the government from using its
eminent domain power to transfer one’s private property to another
private party.80 A “private taking” can occur in two ways: the
government takes private property and gives it to another private
party for a non-public use;81 or a private party, acting pursuant to
government authorization, terminates the property interests of
another private party.82 Private takings are unconstitutional
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713
(2010) (“[T]hough the classic taking is a transfer of property to the State or to another private
party by eminent domain, the Takings Clause applies to other state actions that achieve the
same thing.”).
77 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (noting that the Court’s
regulatory takings jurisprudence seeks to “identify regulatory actions that are functionally
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property
or ousts the owner from his domain”).
78 See infra Section III.B.6.
79 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” (emphasis added)); GA. CONST. art. I, § III, para. I(a) (“[P]rivate property shall
not be taken or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being
first paid.” (emphasis added)).
80 See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (“[T]he Constitution
forbids even a compensated taking of property when executed for no reason other than to
confer a private benefit on a particular private party.”); City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Gas Light
Co., 240 S.E.2d 730, 731 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (“[T]he power of eminent domain may never be
used to acquire property to be used by private individuals solely for private use and private
gain.”).
81 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245 (describing private takings as transfers of property “for no
reason other than to confer a private benefit on a particular private party”).
82 See Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 11, at 278 (“[T]he takings power, understood broadly,
includes the capacity to end or terminate property interests; it does not necessarily require
that another entity acquire those interests.”).
76

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

15

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 [2020], Art. 8

410

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:395

because they “serve no legitimate purpose of [the] government.”83
Therefore, whether an end use is public or private is significant in
determining if one’s real property may be taken, regardless of
whether the taking party pays just compensation.
This Note does not present the first argument that condominium
termination statutes that authorize non-consensual terminations
may be unconstitutional.84 In 2017, a federal district court in
Florida considered a condominium unit owner’s claim that Florida’s
termination statute violated the Takings Clause because the bulk
owner defendant’s termination of the condominium was “not for a
public purpose but for . . . private profit”;85 however, the case was
decided on different grounds without reaching the constitutional
question.86 Other authority and literature do not appear to address
whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s public use decisions permit
states to enact non-consensual condominium termination statutes.
In 1954, the Court began interpreting the Takings Clause’s
“public use” requirement more broadly than in its prior decisions by
holding that a public use may exist even if the government takes
private property and gives it to a “private enterprise for
redevelopment of the area.”87 In Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, the Court expanded its interpretation of public use to
uphold the constitutionality of a Hawaii statute which allowed the
state to take title in real property from lessors and transfer it to
lessees to reduce the concentration of land ownership.88 The Court
recognized that “[a] purely private taking” would be “void,”89 but
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
See Bestoso v. BBVA Compass Bank, No. 17-60884-CIV, 2017 WL 5634936, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. July 25, 2017) (recognizing a plaintiff’s argument that Florida’s condominium
termination statute “is unconstitutional because it permits the taking of private property
without full compensation, and not for a public purpose”); Brito, supra note 17, at 217–18
(arguing that Florida’s condominium termination statute violates the Takings Clause);
Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 11, at 266 (arguing that condominium termination statutes
that authorize terminations without unanimous consent permit unconstitutional private
takings).
85 Bestoso, 2017 WL 5634936, at *3.
86 Id. at *6 (holding that the plaintiff’s constitutional claim would not support the relief he
seeks).
87 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
88 467 U.S. at 241–42 (“Regulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic
exercise of a State’s police powers.”).
89 Id. at 245.
83
84
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reasoned that since the Hawaii legislature passed the statute in
response to a land concentration problem, transferring the land
ownership to reduce land concentration constituted a public use
that was not purely private.90
In a landmark 2005 case, the Court held in Kelo v. City of New
London that economic development was a public use that justified
an otherwise unconstitutional private taking.91 While the Court
noted that states cannot take property “under the mere pretext of a
public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private
benefit,” the taking in Kelo was executed pursuant to a “‘carefully
considered’ development plan.”92 The Court relied on its
“longstanding policy” of deferring to “legislative judgments” in
determining what public needs justify takings.93
Therefore, the Court’s holdings in Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo
authorize the forcible transfer of private property to private parties
when the properties will be used for economic development or other
public purposes that state legislatures determine are beneficial to
the public.94 In light of the Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence,
the non-consensual condominium terminations permitted by the
GCA likely do not serve a public use. While the Court’s holdings in
Kelo and Midkiff support the notion that taking private property
and giving it to another private party for economic development
constitutes a “public use,” the private takings permitted by the GCA

90 Id. (“[N]o purely private taking is involved in these cases. The Hawaii Legislature
enacted its Land Reform Act not to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals but to
attack certain perceived evils of concentrated property ownership in Hawaii—a legitimate
public purpose.”).
91 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005) (upholding a city’s development plan that took homeowners’
properties to revitalize the city’s economy).
92 Id. at 478 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004)).
93 Id. at 480 (“The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City’s
development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’ Without exception, our cases have defined that
concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in
this field.”).
94 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (allowing appropriation of property for a “public
purpose” to make the community more beautiful); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–42 (1984) (finding
appropriation of property constitutional for the public purpose of regulating oligopolies in the
real estate market); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (affirming a city’s development plan to revitalize
its economy that required taking homeowners’ properties).
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are not for any public use—such as economic development—and are
only beneficial to the hostile investors’ private interests.95
Unlike Kelo, where legislative findings explained that the
takings would promote economic development through a carefully
considered development plan,96 the GCA contains no legislative
findings that its termination provision would serve a public purpose
such as economic development.97 While the property owners in Kelo
knew that the taking of their properties would generally serve a
public purpose,98 the GCA provides no assurance that units taken
from a termination and partition will serve a public purpose—it
lacks any procedure to ensure that terminations will result in a
public benefit.99 For example, an investor could take over a
condominium with the mere intent of managing the property in its
current state or selling it to a third party who would manage the
property in its current state. The GCA would even permit a
disgruntled unit owner to obtain the remaining statutory
percentage of units to force a sale simply to evict his undesirable
neighbors. In none of these examples would the bulk owner take the
units for economic development or for any other public purpose.
Some jurisdictions avoid these potential misuses of condominium
termination statutes by providing detailed processes to ensure that
non-consensual terminations will result in a public purpose being

Cf. Brito, supra note 17, at 218–22 (arguing that Florida’s condominium termination
statute does not serve a public purpose). This Note addresses whether the GCA’s termination
provision is constitutional when an investor or bulk owner seeks to terminate a condominium
solely for its private benefit. Non-consensual termination statutes may serve public uses
when the votes are cast by many unit owners rather than a single bulk owner. For example,
termination statutes that permit owners to terminate the condominium when the area
becomes blighted could be beneficial to the public in general. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 718.117(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.) (permitting condominium
termination when continuing to enforce condominium covenants “may create economic waste
and areas of disrepair”). However, these issues are not present—and the public is not
necessarily benefited—when an investor terminates a condominium.
96 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476 (noting that the state statute “expresse[d] a legislative
determination that the taking of land . . . as part of an economic development project is a
‘public use’ and in the ‘public interest’” (quoting Kelo, 843 A.2d at 515–21)).
97 See generally H.R. 619, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1975).
98 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 495–96 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the homeowners were
not “opposed to new development in the area” and that the homeowners argument
acknowledged that “new owners may make more productive use of the property”).
99 See generally O.C.G.A. § 44-3-70 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.).
95
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served.100 Such statutes better conform with Kelo because they
ensure that takings will be for a public use.
Even if the GCA’s termination statute is deemed to satisfy the
public use requirement of the U.S. Constitution’s Takings Clause
because an investor may sell the property to an economic developer,
the statute fails to serve a public use under the Georgia
Constitution’s takings clause.101 The Georgia Constitution left it to
the legislature to determine what constitutes a “public use.”102 In
2006, the Georgia General Assembly defined “public use” as the
following:
(i) The possession, occupation, or use of the land by the
general public or by state or local governmental entities;
(ii) The use of land for the creation or functioning of
public utilities;
(iii) The opening of roads, the construction of defenses,
or the providing of channels of trade or travel;
(iv) The acquisition of property where title is clouded
due to the inability to identify or locate all owners of the
property;
(v) The acquisition of property where unanimous
consent is received from each person with a legal claim
that has been identified and found; or
(vi) The remedy of blight.103
The statute proceeds to expressly reject economic development
as a public use.104 The GCA’s termination statute does not fall

100 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.117(3) (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.)
(“Before a residential association submits a plan to the division, the plan must be approved
by at least [eighty] percent of the total voting interests of the condominium. However, if [five]
percent or more of the total voting interests of the condominium have rejected the plan . . . [it]
may not proceed.”).
101 See O.C.G.A. § 44-3-111 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) (including no
restrictions for sales of property for the purpose of economic development).
102 See GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. VII(a) (“The power of eminent domain shall not be
used for redevelopment purposes by any entity, except for public use, as defined by general
law.”).
103 O.C.G.A. § 22-1-1(9)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.).
104 See id. § 22-1-1(9)(B) (“The public benefit of economic development shall not constitute
a public use.”).
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within any of the General Assembly’s enumerated forms of public
use. When a unit owner terminates a condominium and seeks a
partition against objecting owners, the property goes to a private
party, is not used for public utilities, does not open paths of travel,
does not clear clouds of title, does not result from unanimous
consent, and does not remedy blight.105
Since the GCA permits private parties to forcibly transfer
another’s private property to themselves without requiring it to be
used for any public purpose, the GCA may violate the Georgia
Constitution’s takings clause.106 The General Assembly passed a
statute that provides that if the state passes a “law authorizing the
taking of property for private use rather than for public use, the
courts should declare the law inoperative.”107 Since the statute
authorizes private parties to terminate and take the private
property of others without serving an apparent public use, the
courts should declare the termination statute inoperative.
Nevertheless, if the General Assembly were to make rational
findings and redefine public use, the GCA’s termination statute may
serve a public purpose. The U.S. Supreme Court has broadly
interpreted “public use” and has given state legislatures wide
discretion in determining what takings would serve a public use.108
It is well-established that “[w]hen the legislature’s purpose is
legitimate and its means are not irrational . . . empirical debates
over the wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom
of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out
in the federal courts.”109 Perhaps the General Assembly could
permit economic development to be a public use and adopt a statute
that authorizes bulk owners to terminate condominiums only upon
filing a verification that the termination will serve a public use, such
as economic development.

See supra notes 25–30, 99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40, 99 and accompanying text.
107 O.C.G.A. § 22-1-3 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.).
108 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (“[O]ur public use
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings
power.”).
109 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984).
105
106
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4. Just Compensation. The GCA may also conflict with the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause because minority unit owners
stripped of their units are not likely to receive just compensation.
The Takings Clause requires that “just compensation” be paid to
property owners when their property is taken.110 Generally, just
compensation is “the market value of the property at the time of the
taking.”111 But the public sale that a bulk owner can force following
a condominium termination does not ensure that unit owners will
receive just compensation.112 Once a Georgia condominium is
terminated, the investor may seek a partition for sale under tenancy
in common law.113
When an owner applies for a partition, an appraisal is conducted
to provide the minority unit owners with the opportunity to
purchase the petitioner’s units at the appraised value.114 However,
if the minority owners cannot afford or are otherwise unable to
purchase the petitioner’s units, the public sale that follows does not
require that the minority unit owners receive the appraised price of
their units.115 Instead, the court will appoint three commissioners
“to conduct such [a] sale under such regulations and upon such just
and equitable terms as it may prescribe.”116 Therefore, the court has
discretion to decide whether to prescribe a minimum bid at a forced
condominium sale to ensure that the unit owners recieve just
compensation. This discretion is at odds with the Takings Clause’s
mandate that “private property [shall not] be taken . . . without just
compensation.”117

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
112 See Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi & Richard K. Green, Forced Sale Risk:
Class, Race, and the “Double Discount,” 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 590–91 (2010) (describing
how forced sales generally receive less than fair market value).
113 See O.C.G.A. § 44-3-98(d) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) (providing that
once a condominium is terminated, the unit owners become tenants in common subject to and
governed by tenancy in common law); see also id. § 44-6-160 (permitting any tenant in
common to seek a partition for sale).
114 See id. § 44-6-166.1 (permitting interested parties an opportunity to purchase any
petitioner’s interest at the cost of its appraised share).
115 See id. § 44-6-167.
116 Id. (emphasis added).
117 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
110
111

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

21

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 [2020], Art. 8

416

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:395

Some courts and legal scholars presume that any public sale
automatically results in the receipt of fair market value because the
sale reflects what purchasers in the relevant market are willing to
pay for the property.118 Others, however, have argued that public
sales—especially when forced—are significantly less likely to result
in owners receiving fair market value for their properties.119 The
U.S. Supreme Court has characterized fair market value as the
“antithesis of forced-sale value” because fair market value is
reached in circumstances that are not present at a “public auction
or a sale forced by the necessities of the owner.”120 For example,
public sales usually are not advertised well, do not provide sufficient
time to search for potential purchasers, do not give potential
purchasers ample opportunity to inspect the property in order to
make bids that do not need to account for uncertainties, and are not
the result of a price that is agreed upon by the parties after
negotiation.121 These factors often lead to tenants in common
receiving far less than fair market value for their property.122 Since
the Takings Clause requires fair market value to be paid to property
owners as just compensation,123 and because the GCA authorizes
bulk owners to effectuate forced sales that do not guarantee fair
market value compensation,124 the GCA arguably violates the
Takings Clause.
5. Government Actor. A property owner cannot succeed on a
takings claim unless a government actor was responsible for the
taking.125 The taking must generally be “caused directly by the
118 See, e.g., Drachenberg v. Drachenberg, 58 A.2d 861, 865 (N.J. 1948) (“By partition sale
the estate in common is assumed to realize fair market value . . . .”).
119 See, e.g., Mitchell et al., supra note 112, at 589 (“[F]orced sales of real or personal
property are conducted under conditions that are rarely likely to yield market value prices.”).
120 BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537–38 (1994).
121 See Mitchell et al., supra note 112, at 604–05 (discussing in more depth the factors that
inhibit fair market value from being offered at a forced public sale).
122 Id. at 602 (“Comparing the conditions of a forced sale with the conditions viewed as
necessary for markets to function efficiently helps one understand why a forced-sale price is
likely to represent a significant discount from an asset’s fair market value.”).
123 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
124 The GCA allows bulk owners to force a public sale of minority-owned units, but public
sales typically do not lead to offers for the fair market value of the auctioned property. See
supra notes 25–30, 121–122 and accompanying text.
125 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting the federal government from taking private
property “for public use, without just compensation”); Hunter & Lozada, supra note 8, at 378,
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challenged government conduct,” not just an “incidental result” of
it.126 A state cannot escape a takings claim, however, by just
statutorily authorizing a private entity to take the private property;
a takings claim based on private, third-party action is permitted if
the government authorized the action.127 The U.S. Supreme Court
has explained that although “the classic taking is a transfer of
property to the [s]tate or to another private party by eminent
domain, the Takings Clause applies to other state actions that
achieve the same thing.”128 A government action, although “short of
acquisition of title or occupancy,” amounts to a taking “if its effects
are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of [their]
interest in the subject matter.”129
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court
found a taking occurred when the New York legislature passed a
statute requiring landlords to permit television companies to install
cables on their properties.130 The Court held that the permanent
physical occupation authorized by the government was a taking
although it was a third party that intruded upon the landowner’s
property.131 Since New York statutorily authorized the intrusion,
the takings were subject to the Takings Clause and had to be backed
by just compensation from the state.132
Similar to the New York Legislature’s responsibility for ensuring
that property owners received just compensation when the state
authorized a private party to effectuate a taking, the Georgia
380 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court’s selective incorporation doctrine incorporates most
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, including the Takings Clause, to apply to state governments).
126 Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307,
321 (2007).
127 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding
that a taking “authorized by government constitutes a ‘taking’ of property for which just
compensation is due”); Meltz, supra note 126, at 322 (noting that a government may be liable
for a taking if it “directed or authorized third-party conduct with specific reference to the
plaintiff’s type of property”).
128 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713 (2010).
129 United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
130 458 U.S. at 441 (“We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation
of property is a taking.”).
131 Id. at 426 (“[A] permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking
without regard to the public interests that it may serve.”).
132 Id. at 438, 442 (holding that the pertinent New York statute worked as a taking of the
owner’s property for which the owner was entitled to just compensation).
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General Assembly is likewise responsible for the takings authorized
by the GCA.133 Although Georgia condominium unit owners facing
termination do not go through the traditional eminent domain
process, the GCA authorizes takings because it “achieve[s] the same
thing” when bulk owners use the state’s partition for sale statute,134
and “its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most
of his interest in the subject matter.”135 Further, some scholars
argue that legislatures are the actors responsible for takings that
occur from condominium termination statutes because the
traditional justification for such statutes is that the legislature
believes that it would be better for the property to be held by
another person.136
6. Consent and the “Bitter with the Sweet” Doctrine. A strong
argument exists that no taking occurs when a condominium unit is
purchased after the GCA’s effective date. This is because the owner
“consented” to the possibility of a termination and forced sale by
choosing to purchase a unit from a condominium whose declaration
does not require unanimous consent for termination. This consent
argument may prevail, but it is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s reasoning behind the unconstitutional conditions doctrine137
and its rejection of the “bitter with the sweet” doctrine.138
By applying the Court’s regulatory takings principles, it is
uncertain whether unit owners consent to property deprivations by
condominium termination statutes that exist at the time the owners
gain their property interests. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, the Court examined a claim where an owner of two
beachfront properties alleged that a regulation which had a
133 Id. at 442 (holding a private party liable for a takings claim when the state legislature
authorized a private taking).
134 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 713.
135 Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 378.
136 See, e.g., Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 11, at 279 (“In private-to-private takings, the
state is not involved, at least not directly, and the public purpose, if any, manifests itself
indirectly through some calculation that the property is better held by one owner than
another.”).
137 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that “the government may not require
a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation when
property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.” Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
138 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
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“dramatic effect on the economic value of [the owner’s] lots”
constituted a taking.139 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
introduced the notion of “background principles” to regulatory
takings law.140 The Court held that “confiscatory regulations . . .
cannot be newly legislated or decreed . . . but must inhere in the
title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the
[s]tate’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership.”141 On remand, the South Carolina Coastal Council
could have defeated the landowner’s takings claim only if it showed
that the regulation inhered from the “background principles” of
South Carolina law.142
Following Lucas, some interpreted “background principles” to
include not only state common law, but also all constitutional and
legislative enactments, which—if passed before property is
purchased—would automatically preclude an owner from later
alleging a takings claim.143 The presence of a statute that qualifies
property interests at the time property is acquired theoretically
places the property owner on notice of the limitations on their
property interests.144 But that theory was dismissed just ten years
after Lucas.145 In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court rejected the
505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992).
Id. at 1029.
141 Id.
142 See id. at 1063 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that under the majority’s holding, a
regulation which deprives owners of all economically viable use of their properties are takings
“unless the regulation merely makes explicit what was otherwise an implicit limitation on
the owner’s property rights”).
143
See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & J.B. Ruhl, Background Principles, Takings, and
Libertarian Property: A Reply to Professor Huffman, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 805, 817 (2010) (noting
that “a number of courts have interpreted background principles to include statutes and
constitutional provisions”).
144 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001) (“[T]he argument goes, by
prospective legislation the State can shape and define property rights and reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and subsequent owners cannot claim any injury from lost
value. After all, they purchased or took title with notice of the limitation.”).
145 See id. at 627 (“The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean
bundle. . . . A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings
Clause. This ought not to be the rule.”); Blumm & Ruhl, supra note 143, at 817 n.63
(recognizing that Palazzolo held “that statutes that existed prior to a landowner’s acquisition
were not categorically exempted from takings claims by virtue of the so-called ‘notice rule’”
(quoting Michael C. Blumm, Palazzolo and the Decline of Justice Scalia’s Categorical Takings
Doctrine, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 137, 143–47 (2002))); James L. Huffman, Background
139
140
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proposition that “[a] purchaser or a successive title holder . . . is
deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and is barred
from claiming that it effects a taking.”146 There, the Court held that
a regulation, which was promulgated prior to the property owner’s
acquisition of title, did not preclude him from raising a takings
claim.147 Although the Court noted that “[a] law does not become a
background principle for subsequent owners by enactment itself,” it
declined to address if or when a legislative enactment may
constitute a background principle of state law.148
While the case law is unclear on the issue, condominium
termination statutes—even when enacted prior to when owners
acquire their units—likely do constitute background principles that
bar unit owners from alleging takings upon a termination. Since the
termination statutes were enacted prior to the time the property
was acquired, they arguably “inhere[d] in the title itself.”149 In fact,
by acquiring the unit with constructive knowledge that the GCA
permits non-consensual terminations, the unit owner’s bundle of
sticks may have never included a right to continued possession and
ownership of the unit.150
However, the regulatory takings analysis and notion of
background principles arguably should not be applied to
condominium termination takings because of the unique
circumstances in those cases that are not present in traditional
regulatory takings cases. The Court’s distinction between cases of
direct condemnation and regulatory takings—because of their
inherently different considerations—supports this proposition.151
Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years After Lucas, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 10 n.46 (2008)
(noting that the Palazzolo Court “rejected the notion that preexisting statutory provisions are
a bar to takings claims”).
146 533 U.S. at 626.
147 See id. at 630 (“That claim is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after
the effective date of the state-imposed restriction.”).
148 Id.
149 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
150 See Bellon v. Monroe Cty., 577 N.W.2d 877, 879–80 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (arguing that
a taking does not occur “where it can be shown the property owner’s ‘bundle of rights’ never
included the right to use the land in the way the regulation forbids” (citing Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1027)).
151
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (“Direct
condemnation . . . presents different considerations from cases alleging a taking based on a
burdensome regulation.”).
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While regulatory takings limit one’s use of their property and
require that certain “ripeness requirements” be met before a takings
claim can be brought, for physical takings, one’s property is taken
and the owner becomes entitled to an immediate right to
compensation.152 Unlike regulatory takings cases, when a
condominium is terminated and partitioned for sale, unit owners
are not only deprived of one use of their properties, they also lose
the units’ titles and the right to possess the properties
themselves.153 In such cases, where an entire physical taking is
effectuated, background principles fail to protect property owners.
If background principles were permitted within such cases, states
could limit all property rights at their creation and reduce the
Takings Clause to afford no protections—and thus no
compensation—when a state wishes to take one’s property, working
“a critical alteration to the nature of property” and constitutional
protections.154 Perhaps this is why the notion of background
principles has not yet been applied outside of regulatory takings
analyses.
Under a physical takings analysis, some argue that since
physical takings can occur only at the time the property is taken,
condominium unit owners do not consent to termination statutes at
the time their units are acquired, because it is their objections at
the time of the takings that matter.155 Under this reasoning,
although all individuals who choose to live in the United States may
be said to consent to the government’s eminent domain power, a
physical takings claim still exists at the time of the taking when an
owner objects. Similarly, even if condominium unit owners have
consented “to the possible loss of title, this does not disqualify the
subsequent non-consensual dissolution as a taking” because the
title holder’s objection “at the moment of [the] transfer or
Id. (“A challenge to the application of a land-use regulation . . . does not mature until
ripeness requirements have been satisfied . . . .”).
153 For example, upon a forced sale in Georgia, “the parties in interest shall execute a title
to the purchaser; and, if any of them shall fail or refuse to do so, the commissioners or any
two of them shall execute a deed” which “shall be as valid and binding as if made by the
parties themselves.” O.C.G.A. § 44-6-169 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.).
154 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 609.
155 See Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 11, at 280 (“The fact that the title holders object to
the transfer or the termination of a property interest . . . at the moment of its transfer or
termination, constructs the event as a taking.”).
152
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termination” constitutes the taking.156 However, this argument
appears relatively weak and may be summarily dismissed if a court
decided to apply the notion of background principles outside of the
regulatory takings scheme to reach condominium termination
cases—the termination provision would have “inhere[d] in the title
itself.”157 Instead, the owner would have to argue that the state
never had the ability to condition the unit owner’s property interest
upon consent or waiver of a takings claim; therefore, the consent
was never properly obtained, and background principles could not
apply.
Perhaps the reasoning behind the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine provides a better argument that states cannot condition
property rights upon waivers of takings claims. This doctrine
provides that “the government may not require a person to give up
a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation
when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit
sought has little or no relationship to the property.”158
The doctrine was introduced in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission when the Court held that a state agency could not
condition a rebuilding permit on the owners allowing a public
easement across their property.159 The Court agreed that “a permit
condition that serves the same legitimate [state] purpose as a
refusal to issue the permit” is not a taking “if the refusal to issue
the permit would not constitute a taking,” but it found that no
“nexus [existed] between the condition and the original purpose of
the building restriction”—to preserve “the public’s view of the
beach.”160 Under this doctrine, the government can only condition

Id.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
158 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
159 See 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“[U]nless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose . . . the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an
out-and-out plan of extortion.’” (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 423 A.2d 12, 14–15
(N.H. 1981))).
160 Id. at 836–37. The Court also outlined possible conditions that would have been
constitutional. See id. at 836 (“[I]f the Commission attached to the permit some condition that
would have protected the public’s ability to see the beach notwithstanding construction of the
new house—for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences—so long
156
157
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property rights when doing so substantially advances “a legitimate
state interest.”161 The Court rejected Justice Brennan’s argument
that the property owners had no protectable “reasonable
investment-backed expectation” and thereby consented to the
condition because they “were aware that stringent regulation of
development along the California coast had been in place at least
since 1976.”162
Similarly, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, a city conditioned approval
of a property owner’s application to expand her building upon her
dedicating land for the public purposes of preventing flooding and
traffic congestion in the area.163 The Court held that the city’s
condition failed under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
because “the findings upon which the city relie[d] do not show the
required reasonable relationship between the [requested] easement
and the petitioner’s proposed new building.”164 The Court clarified
that “rough proportionality” must exist between the state’s interest
and its condition; thus, “the city [had to] make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication [was]
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development.”165 The city failed to meet this requirement because it
did not “make [an] effort to quantify its findings in support of the
dedication . . . beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset
some of the traffic” problems created by the property expansion.166
The reasoning behind the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
could apply to condominium termination statutes: a state arguably
cannot condition the discretionary benefit of granting residents
property rights to condominium units upon their waiver of
subsequent takings claims if the property is taken by other unit
owners. Like Nollan and Dolan, the conditioned waiver in
condominium termination cases lacks rough proportionality or an
as
the
Commission
could
have
exercised
its
police
power . . . to
forbid
construction[,] . . . imposition of the condition would also be constitutional.”).
161 Id. at 841 (“[O]ur cases describe the condition for abridgment of property rights through
the police power as a ‘substantial advanc[ing]’ of a legitimate state interest.” (alteration in
original)).
162 Id. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163 512 U.S. 374, 379–82 (1994).
164 Id. at 394–95.
165 Id. at 391.
166 Id. at 395–96.
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essential nexus to the purpose of providing residents with the
ability to live in condominium units. For example, the GCA lacks
legislative findings that the unique structure of condominiums
requires that they be terminable by the unit owners so that holdouts
do not impede economic development. If such a purpose were
articulated and of great importance to the legislature, surely the
condominium termination statute would apply uniformly to all
Georgia condominiums. Instead, the law only applies to Georgia
condominiums whose declarations do not specify the number of unit
owners that must consent for termination to occur.167
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has previously held that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not reach “beyond the
special context of exactions,”168 it has since expanded the doctrine
“to include permit denials and monetary exactions.”169 Even if
courts are unwilling to extend the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to negate the “consent” unit owners give to takings when
they purchase their units, the Court’s rejection of the “bitter with
the sweet” doctrine provides another potential basis.
In Arnett v. Kennedy, the Court faced the question of whether a
federal employee who was granted a property interest in his job by
a regulation may be limited to the amount of process required for
employment termination when that regulation provides for less
process than required under the Constitution.170 Then-Justice
Rehnquist wrote a plurality opinion holding that “where the grant
of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the
limitations on the procedures which are to be employed
in determining that right, a litigant . . . must take the bitter with
the sweet.”171 Therefore, the plurality suggested that statutes and
See O.C.G.A. § 44-3-98 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) (“The condominium
shall be terminated only by the agreement of unit owners of units to which four-fifths of the
votes in the association pertain . . . or such larger majority as the condominium instruments
may specify . . . .” (emphasis added)).
168 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999).
Exactions are “land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of
property to public use.” Id.
169 Scott Woodward, The Remedy for a “Nollan/Dolan Unconstitutional Conditions
Violation,” 38 VT. L. REV. 701, 702 (2014) (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,
570 U.S. 595 (2013)).
170 416 U.S. 134, 147 (1974).
171 Id. at 153–54.
167
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regulations could condition the grant of property interests upon the
property owner’s acceptance of less process than what the Due
Process Clause requires.172 However, “a majority of the justices
rejected” Justice Rehnquist’s “bitter with the sweet” argument.173
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the Court had an
opportunity to render a majority decision that officially rejected the
“bitter with the sweet” doctrine articulated in Arnett.174 The
question presented in Loudermill was whether a state can condition
a security guard’s property interest in his job upon acceptance of a
lower level of process for deprivation than what the Due Process
Clause mandates.175 The Court rejected the “bitter with the sweet”
doctrine, holding that the Due Process Clause’s “minimum
[procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law” and “are
not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own
procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the
preconditions to adverse official action.”176 The Court further
explained that “[w]hile the legislature may elect not to confer a
property interest in [public] employment, it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once
conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.”177 Under
the Court’s reasoning in Loudermill, although a state may create
and define property interests,178 it cannot condition the grant of a
property right on a waiver of its constitutional protections: once a
state confers a property interest, the owner is entitled to the full
protections of the Constitution.
The Court’s rejection of the “bitter with the sweet” doctrine
conflicts with the proposition that unit owners consent to
condominium termination statutes by purchasing units in
condominiums whose declarations are silent regarding termination
See id. at 154 (holding that the property owner “must take the bitter with the sweet”).
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490–91 n.6 (1980); see also D. Benjamin Barros, Defining
“Property” in the Just Compensation Clause, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1877 n.127 (1995)
(“Justice Rehnquist’s position did not command a majority in Arnett.”).
174 470 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1985).
175 Id. at 538–41.
176 Id. at 541 (alterations in original) (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)).
177 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the result in part)).
178 See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702,
707 (2010) (“Generally speaking, state law defines property interests . . . .”).
172
173
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requirements. Loudermill’s holding suggests that although states
may refuse to provide residents with a property interest in
condominium units, once states define the units as property, they
cannot statutorily circumvent the protections of the Takings Clause
by authorizing private takings that are otherwise unconstitutional.
Thus, while the Georgia legislature can define one’s property
interest in their unit, it cannot bypass the protections of the Takings
Clause by conditioning unit ownership upon consent to private
takings without just compensation.
However, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence,
this rejection of the “bitter with the sweet” doctrine is not likely to
proffer successful takings claims. The doctrine has only been used
in due process cases and has not been extended to apply in takings
cases.
Although the Court has rejected that the Due Process Clause
may be used to “do the work of the Takings Clause,” applying the
principle that states cannot grant property rights on the condition
that individuals waive their constitutional protections to the
Takings Clause would be consistent with Loudermill’s reasoning.179
The premise is not based on procedural or substantive due process,
but rather on the general principle that once a property right exists,
it is subject to constitutional protections—statutes in conflict with
those protections are not considered in constitutional analyses.180

IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
Although the GCA’s termination statute would likely be upheld
under the background principles theory, some constitutional
doctrines seem to provide unit owners with viable arguments that
the GCA authorizes unconstitutional private takings.181 The
General Assembly could resolve these issues, without jeopardizing

Id. at 720.
Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (noting that the right
to due process is conferred by constitutional guarantee, and “once it is determined that the
Due Process Clause applies, ‘the question remains what process is due.’ . . . The answer to
that question is not to be found in the [state] statute.” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972))).
181 See discussion supra Section III.B.6.
179
180
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the state’s interest in exercising its police power, by amending
O.C.G.A. section 44-3-98.
First, the General Assembly should amend O.C.G.A. section 443-98 to make it more difficult for investors to conduct hostile
takeovers and take minority unit owners’ properties against their
will. In the 1970s, when numerous states were passing
condominium termination statutes, many did not foresee the
problem that investors could use the statute as a business
strategy.182 In 2017, Florida recognized this problem and amended
its termination statute to provide that whenever five percent of a
condominium’s unit owners object to a termination plan, the
condominium may not be terminated.183 Similarly, the General
Assembly can protect unit owners from private takings by not
permitting terminations so long as any unit owner makes an
affirmative objection. This Note suggests that five percent is not a
sufficient standard because, when the condominium has more than
twenty units, it would take the objection of at least two unit owners
to prevent termination. If multiple unit owners were required to
object, then there could be circumstances where an owner’s property
is forcibly sold despite their objection.
Second, the General Assembly should make legislative findings
to support the purpose behind permitting one person to terminate a
condominium against the objections of the remaining unit owners.
Such findings would provide courts with guidance in determining
the public purpose served by the terminations and would entitle the
termination statute to the strong deference described in Kelo.184 For
example, Florida’s condominium termination statute begins with
legislative findings, including that the continuance of
condominiums sometimes “may create economic waste and areas of
182 See, e.g., Susan Taylor Martin, How a Billion-Dollar Company Could Use a Florida Law
to Force These Tampa Bay Seniors Out of Their Condos, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 12, 2019),
https://www.tampabay.com/business/how-a-billion-dollar-company-could-use-a-florida-lawto-force-these-tampa-bay-seniors-out-of-their-condos-20190712/
(describing
Florida’s
condominium termination statute as “the proverbial law of unintended consequences”
because it incidentally permits investors to force owners from their units).
183 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.117(3) (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.) (“However,
if [five] percent or more of the total voting interests of the condominium have rejected the
plan of termination by negative vote or by providing written objections, the plan of
termination may not proceed.”).
184 See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
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disrepair which threaten the safety and welfare of the public . . .
and it is the public policy of [Florida] to provide by statute a method
to preserve the value of the property interests and the rights of
alienation thereof.”185
Third, the General Assembly may wish to amend O.C.G.A.
section 22-1-1(9) by repealing subsection (B) to recognize that
economic development is a public purpose that condominium
terminations may serve. By recognizing economic development as a
public purpose for taking private property, the GCA would not
authorize unconstitutional takings.186
Fourth, O.C.G.A. section 44-3-98 should be amended to require
bulk owners seeking to terminate a condominium to submit a
verification that the proposed termination would support one of the
General Assembly’s identified public purposes. Such verifications
would ensure that taken property is used for a constitutional, public
purpose.
Fifth, the General Assembly could simply require that all
condominium declarations include a provision that specifies
whether unanimity or a lower percentage would be required to
terminate the condominium. If declarations were statutorily
required to provide for termination provisions, the unit owners
would have no takings claim because it would be the unit owners—
not the state through its default provisions—which would
contractually authorize the termination of the owners’ property
interests. Under such circumstances, there is no government actor
for there to be a takings claim.
Finally, the General Assembly should provide that when an
owner seeks to terminate a condominium and partition for sale, the
property may not be sold unless the winning bid would provide the
minority unit owners with their shares of the appraised value
calculated in O.C.G.A. section 44-6-166.1. Generally, just
compensation is “the market value of the property at the time of the
taking.”187 Requiring a minimum bid of the appraised value would

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.117(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.).
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005) (holding that economic
development is a public use that justifies an otherwise unconstitutional private taking).
187 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (first citing Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923); and then citing Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13,
17 (1933)).
185
186
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ensure that objecting unit owners receive just compensation for
their taken property.

V. CONCLUSION
While the private takings that the Georgia Condominium Act’s
termination statute authorize may not conflict with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s current Takings Clause jurisprudence, the
General Assembly should be aware of the effects that the statute
currently has on condominium unit owners. To protect the state’s
condominium unit owners, and to ward off potential constitutional
violations, the General Assembly should amend O.C.G.A. section
44-3-98 to require the unanimous consent of unit owners prior to
termination or to require a showing that condominium terminations
serve a form of public use.
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